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In the Eurozone, the financial crisis effects have been hit countries in a different manner.  
Austerity policies have not been good for everyone and have caused inequality in some 
groups. Some countries of the periphery have showed more vulnerable, producing 
alarming figures on output decreases and unemployment increases, particularly those of 
young unemployment. This compromise the inter-generational aspects of sustainable 
growth and development.  
In this paper, we consider an economic framework featuring the use of monetary 
and fiscal rules within a monetary union. In this scenario, that should be representative of 
the Eurozone, we will analyse the effects of stabilization policies when dealing with a 
financial crisis having contractive effects on output. 
Using data provided by Eurostat, we will perform an empirical application for 
three sets of European countries: the core, the peripheral, and the Eastern countries. In 
our analysis, we will also differentiate countries according with their historical 
unemployment path. We will show the results of stabilization fiscal policies by the 
supply-side, in terms of output and young unemployment before the crisis, 2007, and ten 
years later, 2017. The exercises will be performed under different degrees of 
conservativeness of the central bank, austerity of the fiscal authorities and different levels 
of public debt. Our results could help us to stablish the conditions under which 
stabilization policies have would lead to a less inequality outcomes. 
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In the Eurozone, the financial crisis effects have been hit countries in a different manner.  
Certain groups of the periphery have showed more vulnerable, producing alarming 
figures on output decreases and unemployment increases, particularly those of youth 
unemployment. This compromise the inter-generational aspects of sustainable growth and 
development. The process of job destruction, which began after the crisis initiated in 
2007, has had a particularly negative effect on youth unemployment. This was already a 
structural problem in several countries, mainly developing and peripheral ones, which has 
been aggravated by the crisis. Youth unemployment, by affecting the economic situation 
of the younger population, compromises the potential growth and the sustainability of the 
economy.  
These problems become particularly relevant in the case of the member countries 
of a monetary union facing a sovereign debt crisis, given that fiscal policy is the only 
domestic stabilization policy, and is also constrained by the need to carry out fiscal 
consolidation and reduce debt levels. But even in a set of integrated economies as the 
European Union (EU) and the Eurozone prove to be, the policies measures adopted for 
recovering after the crisis become of special relevance. For contributing to the recovery 
of the recent crisis, based on the Juncker Plan, the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI) is aimed to promote jobs and sustainable development (European 
Commission, 2017). 
As was addressed by Blanchard (2004), the evolution of the average European 
unemployment rate hides large cross-country differences and the path of unemployment 
have been very different across countries.  One of the reasons is that in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), the member countries are characterized by the diversity of their 
labour markets. And given that labour market institutions differ across European 
countries, macroeconomic shocks, institutional changes, and international integration 
influence unemployment changes (Bertola, 2017). During the last decade, the Great 
Recession has had a profound impact. In 2017, youth unemployment (less than 25 years) 
in Germany, at 6.70%, was the lowest of the Eurozone countries (18.33% in average), 
followed by the Netherlands at 8.87%. By contrast, the highest figures have been reached 
by Greece, 43%, and Spain, 38% (Eurostat). 
In this paper, we will analyse, in strategic terms, the effects of stabilization 
policies on unemployment, using government deficit besides the use of fiscal policies by 
the supply side (FPSS). After calculating changes on unemployment figures, our results 
will characterize the economic framework conditions under which FPSS could reduce 
unemployment. 
To that aim, we will made use of a simple model for a monetary union (Díaz-
Roldán, 2017) using explicit policy rules and allowing for a more, or less conservative 
governor of the central bank. We will also consider both an austere and no austere fiscal 
policy and, finally, we will take in account the initial level of public debt of the member 
countries of the union. Our analysis will focus on the collective affected by youth 




In order to highlight the effects of the different macroeconomic performance 
among EMU members, in this paper, we will perform an empirical application for three 
sets of European countries: the core, the peripheral, and the Eastern countries. We will 
show the results of stabilization fiscal policies by the supply-side, in terms of output and 
young unemployment before the crisis, 2007, and ten years later, 2017. 
The paper structures as follows: the next section is dedicated to show the 
modelling strategy, next we will perform an empirical application discussing the results. 
Finally, in the concluding remarks we will summarize the main findings and their policy 
implications. 
 
2. Modelling strategy 
 
2.1 The baseline model 
 
We follow the approach by Díaz-Roldán (2017), in which a simple macroeconomic model 
describing a monetary union is developed. The common monetary authority tries to 
control inflation, while the national fiscal authorities are concerned by output 
stabilization; being they also constrained by the fiscal discipline imposed by monetary 
agreements. In such environment, we will try to explore which would be the optimal fiscal 
policies and their implications on macroeconomic variables when unions exert their 
bargaining power. To that aim, we will consider different preferences of the fiscal 
authorities, the possibility of conducting fiscal policies in an individual or in a coordinated 
way, as well as the scope of collective bargaining for stabilizing unemployment, after 
suffering a contractive demand shock, trying to describe the recent economic crisis shock. 
One of our contributions would be to include explicit monetary and fiscal rules. Finally, 
we will illustrate the theoretical results by performing an empirical exercise.  
When performing our exercise, we will adopt the following assumptions: our 
model describes a small monetary union, formed by two countries. The Central Bank 
(CB) follows a monetary policy rule. We assume a conservative central banker, to 
characterize a monetary authority particularly concerned on inflation targeting goal. 
Regarding fiscal authorities they use a “disciplined” fiscal rule, i.e., the fiscal authority is 
more concerned on fiscal consolidation, reducing government deficit, than in promoting 
output growth. The fiscal authorities could reveal different preferences on fiscal austerity, 
i.e., giving more or less weight to government deficit deviations in their loss function, 
respect to output stabilization. The initial level of government debt could be also low or 
high. In this environment, the fiscal authorities can act in an individual (Nash solution) 
or in a coordinated manner (Cooperative solution), when deciding the level of government 
deficit. 
In this scenario, for characterizing the role played by unions, we will assume that 
they could have or not bargaining power. When the bargaining power is positive, we find 
an active union trying to reduce unemployment even at the cost of reducing wages. If the 




Variables are defined as logarithmic deviations from their equilibrium levels. A 
more detailed description of the model can be found in the Appendix. 
The aggregate demand and the aggregate supply functions for each country are as 
follows: 
112211 vhgcypbpay                            (1) 
221122 vhgcypbpay                            (2) 
111 spty                                                             (3) 
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Equations (1) and (2) represent the aggregate demand function for each member 
country of the monetary union, where y1, y2 are the outputs,  p1,  p2, the inflation rates, 
g1, g2 the budget deficits, i.e., the fiscal policy instrument, and v1, v2 capture any kind of 
expansionary demand shock. Equations (3) and (4) represent the aggregate supply 
function for each member country of the monetary union, where s1, s2 capture any 
expansionary supply side shock. 
Solving (1) to (4), we obtain the reduced forms. Looking at the coefficients of the 
equations of the model (see Appendix), when monetary authorities are particularly 
concerned by inflation targeting and follow a monetary policy rule the “beggar-thy-
neighbour” effect prevails (demand shocks are transmitted abroad in an asymmetric way, 
i.e., with the opposite sign). Given that we will focus on the scope of fiscal policies when 
unions have bargaining power, aimed to deal with a demand shock for characterizing the 
recent crisis, we will neglect supply side shocks hereafter. 
      y1 = A hg1 + A v1 − B hg2 −  B v2                                      (5) 
y2 = A hg2 + Av2 −  B hg1 −   B v1                          (6) 
p1 = A’ hg1 + A’ v1 + B’ hg2 + B’ v2                     (7) 
p2 = A’ hg2 + A’ v2 + B’ hg1 + B’ v1                     (8) 
Besides this consideration, we will also include in our model the restriction 
imposed by the requirement of achieving the fiscal discipline goal. To do that, we will 
allow the adoption of an explicit fiscal rule to characterize the deficit path followed by 
fiscal authorities. Following Ballabriga and Martínez-Mongay (2003), we will consider a 
fiscal rule which relates an explicit public deficit target (in terms of the GDP), go, with 
public debt deviations (in terms of the GDP) with respect to its optimal level (d-1 – do), 
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The public deficit adjusts according to the following path, where 10  : 
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From (9) and (10), we obtain the fiscal rules for each member country of the union: 
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o
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Adding the variables that are given in period 1, and rewriting, we obtain the simplified 
fiscal rules for each member country of the union: 
111 ykg            (11) 
222 ykg            (12) 
Notice that if )( 1,
o
ii dd  > 0, then ki < 0, indicating a country with a relatively high level 
of debt. And the opposite holds for ki > 0, indicating a country with a relatively low level 
of debt. 
To solve the optimization problem, we will assume that fiscal authorities (FAs) 
will try to minimize their loss function constrained by the economic framework (given by 
the reduced form of the macroeconomic model, equations (5) to (8)), and the explicit 
fiscal rule (equations (11) and (12)). Their goals will be to minimize output changes, yi, 
with stabilization purposes, and to minimize public deficit changes, gi, in order to 
guarantee fiscal discipline.  
In this framework, among the set of FAs decisions, we will focus on the individual 
management of fiscal policy, and on the case of a coordinated decision. In both cases, we 
will allow for the use of a fiscal rule in both countries. That optimization problem could 
describe a macroeconomic scenario similar the current situation of European Union fiscal 
governance, since the European Commission has recently enforced fiscal policy 
coordination and the use of numerical fiscal rules. 
Solving the optimization problem, we will obtain the optimal (fiscal) policy, i.e., 
the optimal level of public deficit compatible with the stabilization goal (see Appendix 
for details). The optimization problem of country 1 (symmetric for country 2) when the 
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where 2,122  igy iii   is the loss function of the FAs.  













2.2 The main results. 
 
To illustrate the current situation faced by the Eurozone countries, in the empirical 
application we have computed the values for the case of a common demand contractive 
shock, leading to contractive effects on output and prices, and provoking a rise on 
unemployment figures. 
For doing that, we have adopted the following assumptions. The shocks suffered 
by the countries have been normalized to 1, so they are perfectly symmetric in size, 
although the shocks may differ in their sign, being perfectly asymmetric in their effects. 
Next, we will give numerical values to the parameters of the equations describing the 
model features (See Diaz-Roldán (2017) for details). 
(1) In the monetary rule: we will assign a relatively high value to the weight of the 
inflation goal, to characterize a more conservative central banker. 
(2) In the fiscal rule, we will describe a  “disciplined” scenario in which there is a greater 
concern about deviations of debt and accumulated deficit than about deviations in 
production, aimed to fulfil fiscal consolidation supranational requirements as can be 
observed in the Eurozone. 
 (3) In the loss function we would assume that fiscal authorities could be more concerned 
about fiscal discipline or, on the contrary, they could be more concerned about output 
growth, to characterize a more austere or less austere national fiscal authority. 
After solving the optimization problems for the cooperative and the non-
cooperative solution of the fiscal authorities, we obtain the optimal solution for the budget 
deficits, and we are also able to calculate the corresponding values of output and inflation. 
Additionally, we calculate the percentage of change of the unemployment rate u, when 
none FPSS is applied; and we calculate also the percentage of change of the 
unemployment rate uF, when the fiscal authority applies any kind of FPSS (changes on 
contributions paid by employees, social security contributions by employers, payroll 
taxes, or indirect taxes). The numerical results for unemployment are reported in Table 1. 
Given the variables of the model are defined as logarithmic deviations from their 
equilibrium levels, and the values of the shocks have been normalized to 1, the figures of 
the tables should be interpreted as deviation points from the equilibrium level. To the 
extent that our variable of interest is unemployment, figures on table 1 can be interpreted 
as the increase (+) or decrease (‒) of the deviation of the actual unemployment rate from 
the NAIRU. 
According to that, we will obtain different macroeconomic results depending on: 
(i) the degree of austerity of fiscal authorities’ attitude, (ii) the initial level of government 
debt of countries; (iii) and the way in which fiscal authorities solve their optimization 
problem: in a cooperative or in an individual manner.  
In Table 1 we can see the deviations of total unemployment using or not FPSS, 
under different macroeconomic scenarios. As have been explained above, the scenarios 
differ depending on the fiscal authorities’ decision (cooperative of no cooperative), their 
preferences (austere or no austere), and the initial level of government debt.  
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As can be seen, the best result (the biggest decrease of the deviation) is obtained 
when fiscal authorities act in a cooperative manner, have no austere preferences, apply 
FPSS, and both countries show low debt figures. 
On the contrary, the worst result is produced when countries show high debt 
figures and the fiscal authorities cooperate. In the face of high debt levels, the no 
cooperative decision, joint with no austere preferences, proves to be the best. 
 
Table 1 




high debt low debt 
u = 7.18 u = ‒8.64 
uF = 9.15 uF = ‒16.09 
y = 5.6 y = 5.18 
no 
austere 
u = 11.74 u = ‒7.16 
uF = 14.49 uF = ‒29.76 
y = 10.04 y = 9.27 
Non cooperative solution 
 
austere 
high debt low debt 
u = ‒2.73 u = 3.00 
uF = ‒7.37 uF = 6.04 
y = ‒7.54 y = 6.96 
no 
austere 
u = ‒4.04 u = 5.88 
uF = ‒12.09 uF = 11.76 
y = ‒13.64 y = 12.59 
Source: Own elaboration based on the model by Díaz-Roldán (2017) and the described scenario. 
Notes: u = total unemployment without using fiscal policy by the supply-side 




3.2 The empirical application to the Eurozone 
 
Since we are interested on the collective affected by youth unemployment in the 
Eurozone, we will show the changes of the figures reported in Table 1 if we apply those 
qualitative results to Eurozone members. As we mentioned in the Introduction section, in 
the Eurozone, the financial crisis effects have been hit countries in a different manner.  
For that reason, we will differentiate three sets of countries: the core, the peripheral and 
the Eastern countries1. Those groups have not shown the same macroeconomic trend after 
the recent crisis, especially if we look at their rates of growth in Table 2. 
                                                          
1 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
CORE countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. 
PIIGS countries: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain. 




In Table 2 we can see the real GDP growth rate. The countries grouped as PIIGS, 
show figures three times higher than the CORE countries ten years after the crisis.  
 
Table 2: Real GDP growth rate, % change on previous year. 
 Eurozone CORE PIIGS CEE 
2007 3.10 4.26 3.28 9.30 
2017 2.40 2.26 3.20 4.34 
Source: Eurostat 
As showed in Table 3, in 2017, the youth unemployment in PIIGS countries, 
doubles the figure of youth unemployment in the CORE countries. 
 
Table 3: Percentage of active population (seasonally adjusted data) of youth 
unemployment (less than 25 years). 
 Eurozone CORE PIIGS CEE 
2007 15.50 15.00 18.40 12.00 
2017 18.33 14.54 31.10 14.51 
Source: Eurostat 
Taking in account data on Tables 2 and 3, we have computed the percentage of change of 
the youth unemployment rate when none FPSS is applied; and the percentage of change 
of the youth unemployment rate, when the fiscal authority applies any kind of FPSS.  
The obtained results for total unemployment and GDP growth, showed in Table 
1, hold when looking at total youth unemployment of the Eurozone (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
Youth unemployment, and GDP growth. 




high debt low debt 
2007 2017 2007 2017 
u = 1.11 u = 1.32 u = ‒1.34 u = ‒1.58 
uF = 1.42 uF = 1.68 uF = ‒2.49 uF = ‒2.95 
y =0.17 y = 0.13 y = 0.16 y = 0.12 
no 
austere 
u = 1.82 u = 2.15 u = ‒1.11 u = ‒1.31 
uF = 2.25 uF = 2.66 uF = ‒4.61 uF = ‒5.46 
y = 0.31 y = 0.24 y = 0.29 y = 0.22 
Non cooperative solution 
 
austere 
high debt low debt 
2007 2017 2007 2017 
u = ‒0.42 u = ‒0.50 u = 0.47 u = ‒0.74 
uF= ‒1.14 uF= ‒1.35 uF = 0.94 uF = ‒2.22 
y = ‒0.23 y = ‒0.18 y = 0.22 y = 0.17 
no 
austere 
u = ‒0.63 u = ‒0.74 u = 0.91 u = 1.08 
uF= ‒1.87 uF= ‒2.22 uF = 1.82 uF = 2.16 
y = ‒0.42 y = ‒0.33 y = 0.39 y = 0.30 
Source: Own elaboration based on Table 1 and data obtained from Eurostat. 
Notes: u = youth unemployment without using fiscal policy by the supply-side 





In Table 5 we can see the average of government debt. The countries grouped as 
PIIGS double debt figures in ten years and show figures three times higher than the CORE 
countries, ten years after the crisis.  
 
Table 5: Gross government debt, average, percentage GDP. 
 Eurozone CORE PIIGS CEE 
2007 65.00 53.12 66.16 16.10 




Having debt figures into account we could conclude that, in terms of our model, 
CORE and CEE countries are “low debt” countries, and PIIGS are “high debt” countries, 
since their debt figures are always under or below the Eurozone average, respectively. 
Having this into account we have split the Eurozone in three sets of countries (the CORE, 









high debt low debt 
2007 2017 2007 2017 
u = 1.08 u = 1.04 u = ‒1.30 u = ‒1.26 
uF = 1.37 uF = 1.33 uF = ‒2.41 uF = ‒2.34 
y = 0.24 y = 0.13 y = 0.22 y = 0.12 
no 
austere 
u = 1.76 u = 1.71 u = ‒1.07 u = ‒1.04 
uF = 2.17 uF = 2.11 uF = ‒4.46 uF = ‒4.33 
y = 0.43 y = 0.23 y = 0.39 y = 0.21 
Non cooperative solution 
 
austere 
high debt low debt 
2007 2017 2007 2017 
u = ‒0.41 u = ‒0.40 u = 0.45 u = 0.44 
uF= ‒1.11 uF= ‒1.07 uF = 0.91 uF = 0.88 
y = ‒0.32 y = ‒0.17 y = 0.30 y = 0.16 
no 
austere 
u = ‒0.61 u = ‒0.59 u = 0.88 u = 0.85 
uF= ‒1.81 uF= ‒1.76 uF = 1.76 uF = 1.71 
y = ‒0.58 y = ‒0.31 y = 0.54 y = 0.28 
Source: Own elaboration based on Table 1 and data obtained from Eurostat. 
Notes: u = youth unemployment without using fiscal policy by the supply-side 












high debt low debt 
2007 2017 2007 2017 
u = 1.32 u = 2.23 u = ‒1.59 u = ‒2.69 
uF = 1.68 uF = 2.85 uF = ‒2.96 uF = ‒5.00 
y = 0.18 y = 0.18 y = 0.17 y = 0.17 
no 
austere 
u = 2.16 u = 3.65 u = ‒1.32 u = ‒2.23 
uF = 2.67 uF = 4.51 uF = ‒5.48 uF = ‒9.26 
y = 0.33 y = 0.32 y = 0.30 y = 0.30 
Non cooperative solution 
 
austere 
high debt low debt 
2007 2017 2007 2017 
u = ‒0.50 u = ‒0.85 u = 0.55 u = 0.93 
uF= ‒1.36 uF= ‒2.29 uF = 1.11 uF = 1.88 
y = ‒0.25 y = ‒0.24 y = 0.23 y = 0.22 
no 
austere 
u = ‒0.74 u = ‒1.26 u = 1.08 u = 1.83 
uF= ‒2.22 uF= ‒3.76 uF = 2.16 uF = 3.66 
y = ‒0.45 y = ‒0.44 y = 0.41 y = 0.40 
Source: Own elaboration based on Table 1 and data obtained from Eurostat 
Notes: u = youth unemployment without using fiscal policy by the supply-side 








high debt low debt 
2007 2017 2007 2017 
u = 1.08 u = 1.04 u = ‒1.30 u = ‒1.25 
uF = 1.37 uF = 1.33 uF = ‒2.41 uF = ‒2.33 
y = 0.52 y = 0.24 y = 0.48 y = 0.22 
no 
austere 
u = 1.76 u = 1.70 u = ‒1.07 u = ‒1.04 
uF = 2.17 uF = 2.10 uF = ‒4.45 uF = ‒4.32 
y = 0.93 y = 0.44 y = 0.86 y = 0.40 
Non cooperative solution 
 
austere 
high debt low debt 
2007 2017 2007 2017 
u = ‒0.41 u = ‒0.40 u = 0.45 u = 0.44 
uF= ‒1.11 uF= ‒1.07 uF = 0.91 uF = 0.88 
y = ‒0.70 y = ‒0.33 y = 0.65 y = 0.30 
no 
austere 
u = ‒0.61 u = ‒0.59 u = 0.88 u = 0.85 
uF= ‒1.81 uF= ‒1.75 uF = 1.76 uF = 1.71 
y = ‒1.27 y = ‒0.59 y = 1.17 y = 0.55 
Source: Own elaboration based on Table 1 and data obtained from Eurostat. 
Notes: u = youth unemployment without using fiscal policy by the supply-side 





According to our model, when looking at Tables 6 to 8, we can see the results of 
stabilization fiscal policies by the supply-side, in terms of output and young 
unemployment before the crisis, 2007, and ten years later, 2017. Those results would 
indicate that:  
 For the CORE and the CEE countries, the best solution for: 
o fighting youth unemployment would be given by the cooperation among 
their fiscal authorities (when having decisions on the optimal level of 
government deficit), act in a no austere manner (showing a growth 
promoting preferences) and use any kind of fiscal policy by the supply 
side. 
o promoting output growth, would be given by no cooperation and no 
austerity. 
 For the PIIGS countries, the best solution would be: 
o for fighting youth unemployment: no cooperation among fiscal authorities 
(i.e., not to implement the same objective for government deficit when 
managing fiscal policy at country level); act in a no austere manner and 
use any kind of fiscal policy by the supply side. 
o For promoting output growth: cooperation and no austerity. 
Notice that under our model assumptions (conservative central banker, and the use of a 
disciplined fiscal rule aimed to achieve fiscal consolidation), fiscal authorities should be 
no austere for achieving better results when fighting youth unemployment, and also for 
promoting economic growth. In other words, when optimizing their loss function, they 
should give more weight to the output stabilization goal that to the government deficit 
reduction.  
 
3. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have analysed the effects of stabilization policies on youth 
unemployment, using government deficit besides the use of fiscal policy by the supply 
side; aimed to characterize the economic framework conditions under which fiscal policy 
could reduce youth unemployment in a monetary union. 
To that aim, we have considered an economic framework featuring the use of 
monetary and fiscal rules within a monetary union. In this scenario, that should be 
representative of the Eurozone, we have analysed the effects of stabilization policies when 
dealing with a financial crisis having contractive effects on output. We have payed special 
attention to the conservativeness of the central bank, the degree of austerity of the fiscal 
authorities and the initial level of public debt. Those characteristics prove to be crucial 
for the sustainability of economic policies packages based on fiscal consolidation and the 
use of fiscal policy instruments by the supply side.  
But in the Eurozone, the financial crisis effects have been hit countries in a 
different manner.  Certain groups of the periphery have showed more vulnerable, 
producing alarming figures on output decreases and unemployment increases, particularly 
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those of youth unemployment. This compromise the inter-generational aspects of 
sustainable growth and development. For that reason, in our analysis, we have 
differentiated monetary union’s member countries according with their macroeconomic 
performance.  
According to our results, the CORE and the CEE countries, when fighting youth 
unemployment should coordinate their fiscal authorities’ decisions, act in a no austere 
manner and they should use any kind of fiscal policy by the supply side. On the contrary, 
the PIIGS countries, should manage their fiscal policies in an individual way, act in a no 
austere manner and they also should use any kind of fiscal policy by the supply side. 
Regarding output growth, the CORE and the CEE countries should no coordinate their 
fiscal police, and PIIGS countries should coordinate; but the three set of countries should 











The macroeconomic model 
Demand side 
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From (1.A) to (3.A) we obtain the aggregate demand for each country 
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Where zw captures the exogenous factors affecting wages determination, including taxes 
affecting labor market, such as contributions paid by employees, payroll taxes and 
indirect taxes. And zp captures exogenous factors that affect pricing, including social 




From (4.A) to (9.A) we obtain the aggregate supply for each country 
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The “beggar-thy-neighbour” effect prevails when policy-makers are particularly concerned by 
inflation targeting instead by output stabilization (the coefficient , in the monetary rule ─ 
equation (3.A) ─ is high enough when there is also an explicit output stabilization goal, or simply 
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Reduced form 
den = (ct +b)2 – (a + t)2 < 0 
A =  
den
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A’ =  
den
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> 0, B’ = 
den
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tacctb )()( 




Solving (1) to (4), we obtain the reduced forms:  
y1 = A hg1 + A v1  ± B hg2  ±  B v2  C s1  D s2                  (5a) 
y2 = A hg2 + Av2  ±  B hg1  ±   B v1  C s2  D s1                   (6a) 
p1 = A’hg1 + A’v1 + B’hg2 + B’v2 + C’s1 + D’s2                 (7a) 
p2 = A’hg2 + A’v2 + B’hg1 + B’v1 + C’ s2 + D’s1                             (8a) 
When the “beggar-thy-neighbour” effect prevails (inflation targeting): 
y1 = A hg1 + A v1   B hg2    B v2  C s1  D s2                  (5) 
y2 = A hg2 + Av2    B hg1     B v1  C s2  D s1                  (6) 
p1 = A’hg1 + A’v1 + B’hg2 + B’v2 + C’s1 + D’s2                (7) 
p2 = A’hg2 + A’v2 + B’hg1 + B’v1 + C’ s2 + D’s1                       (8) 
 
Optimization problem 
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Numerical values for the empirical exercise 
 
Parameters of the model 
 = 0.28      = 0.05      = 
3
2
      t = 
2
3
       =  
2
1
     h = 0.87719 
 = 0.8 
a = 1.4211 
b = 5.4386 × 10-2 
c = − 0.31579 
den  = − 2.5207 
A = 0.97717 
B = 0.24951 
C = 7.3436× 10-2  
D = 5.9069× 10-2 
A’ = 0.65145 
B’ = 0.16634 
C’ = 0.50460 
D’=3.9379× 10-2 
 
Parameters of the fiscal rule 
Fiscal Authorities preferences:  = 1.3              or            = 0.7 
Fiscal rule 
Disciplined FR: = = 0.75, and = (1─) = 0.25 
Hight debt: d-1 = 90                              Low debt: d-1 = 30 
g = 14.7 – y  g = – 15.3 – y 
 
 
Effects on unemployment rate 
From equations 6.A and 9.A we find that: 
li + prodi = ui + yi  





iici zzyups   
 
Assuming that 1, cp is equal to ip when none shocks occurs, we will calculate: 
a. The value of ui for si = 0, when (zp +zw) = 0 (value of u in Tables). 
b. The value of ui for si = 0, when (zp +zw) ≠ 0, i.e., when union has any bargaining 
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